

SECRET [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SAVA 73-98

9 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : The Missing Radio Hanoi Announcement

1. We have received some comments and further information from our Station in Saigon which shed additional light on the matter you and I discussed several times over the telephone yesterday (8 June). As you will recall, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had reported that he had learned of a Radio Hanoi alert telling all Vietnamese to listen for a special announcement at 2300 South Vietnamese time on Friday, 8 June. Careful monitoring by FBIS, however, picked up nothing but regular programming from Radio Hanoi at that hour. There was a "special" broadcast on Liberation Radio (ostensibly the voice of the PRG) at 2200 South Vietnamese time on 8 June but this consisted solely of a broadcast of the text of a speech PRG President Phat had allegedly given on 6-7 June to the PRG Council of Ministers and Phat's speech contained nothing extraordinary.

2. On 8 June our Station received reports from Bien Hoa, Danang and Nha Trang to the effect that the VC had been directed to stand by for action and ordered to listen to Radio Hanoi on the night of 8 June for an important announcement. A reconstruction of the sequence of events leading to the generation of these separate reports suggests that all of them were based on a VC document, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] This document instructed VC units to be combat ready and informed them that an important announcement was to be made by Radio Hanoi at 2200 hours Hanoi time -- which is 2300 hours Saigon time -- on three cited short wave frequencies. [REDACTED]

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3. Understandably and properly, our Station attached considerable importance to these reports [REDACTED] because of the course of the Paris talks and particularly in light of a report [REDACTED] The latter is the report which we discussed over the phone on 7 June, whose full text I sent you on that day, which was given to Dr. Kissinger in Paris, and was disseminated (per your instructions) in a truncated version as [REDACTED] This report included a statement that VC cadre were to listen to Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio "to learn the exact time for action." From all of this evidence, it seemed clear to the Station that the VC was being alerted that negotiations in Paris were proceeding on schedule and a signal for military action was to be taken from a Hanoi broadcast.

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4. As it turned out, no such signal was given on 8 June. As is now clear, the sequence of events originally envisaged by Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, and reflected accurately in COSVN guidance, came unglued. The Paris negotiations were not completed on schedule, largely because of the GVN's problems with the proposed text of a new agreement. We share our Station's view that the Communists have learned from painful previous experience and will probably not issue final attack orders until they are certain that the precise time of a new cease-fire implementation is solidly fixed. Such was not the case on 8 June and indeed is not the case as of this writing on 9 June.

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5. We believe our various sources' information and reports on enemy intentions were excellent but the Communists slipped their timetable because of unanticipated circumstances beyond their control.

/s/

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee

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